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Comment Jeﬀrey R. Brown
This chapter provides powerful evidence about a deceptively simple idea:
“defaults matter.” The chapter nicely summarizes the large and growing lit-
erature (the lion’s share of which was authored by various combinations of
the current authors) about the power of default options to inﬂuence a wide
range of behaviors related to retirement security. 
Speciﬁcally, the authors provide evidence about how defaults inﬂuence
behavior along every major dimension of the ﬁnancial planning process re-
lated to retirement, including: (1) the decision of whether to participate in
a 401(k) plan; (2) how much to contribute, conditional on participating; (3)
what portfolio allocation to choose for those contributions; (4) what to do
with the money when one leaves an employer; and (5) how to withdraw the
money at retirement.
The foundation for this chapter is a large set of individual research proj-
ects that analyze a variety of natural or designed experiments to determine
the eﬀect of default options on individual behavior. To varying degrees, the
underlying studies are individually compelling. Taken as a whole, the com-
bined evidence is undeniable and overwhelming.
After providing this careful review of the existing evidence, the authors
then explore several potential explanations for why defaults have such a
strong eﬀect on individual behavior, in contrast to the standard neoclassi-
cal model. These explanations include the following:
1. There are low average levels of ﬁnancial literacy. Many studies indi-
cate that most U.S. citizens are unable to correctly answer fairly basic ques-
tions about investment characteristics, such as whether a money market
fund holds stocks or whether an individual employer’s stock is more or less
risky than a diversiﬁed stock fund.
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search.2. Individuals view the default option as an endorsement, that is, as im-
plicit investment advice from the plan sponsor.
3. Defaults provide a shortcut through the tremendous complexity fac-
ing individuals trying to make these decisions on their own.
4. Individuals are biased toward the present, and defaults help them to
circumvent procrastination.
My suspicion is that all of these factors matter both individually and in
combination. Nonetheless, the logical next step in this literature is to de-
termine the relative importance of these factors and whether that ranking
is the same in all contexts. Understanding the underlying determinants is
of more than academic interest—it is also important for assessing whether
there are other interventions that may inﬂuence behavior and possibly lead
individuals to make more active decisions that may improve individual
welfare.
The role of default options is particularly important in the context of re-
tirement planning for at least two reasons. First, developing an optimal
life-cycle savings and investment plan is extremely complex, particularly
when one accounts for the many sources of uncertainty that one faces (e.g.,
earnings, rates of return, inﬂation, health status, medical expenditures,
and longevity). The advice of “experts” is not necessarily the solution to
the complexity problem, given the numerous and conﬂicting sources of in-
vestment advice available in the marketplace. Second, unlike many other
contexts where one can “learn by doing,” the opportunity to learn from
one’s mistakes is limited in this context. The reason is that an individual
may not realize their mistakes until it is too late to ﬁx them. For example,
it does one little good to learn at age seventy that they should have saved
more at age ﬁfty.
The authors suggest that the alternative to a default option is to enforce
an active decision. My view diﬀers in a subtle way: even with active deci-
sion enforcement, there is still a default option. The default is to simply ac-
cept whatever penalty or punishment is meted out for a failure to actively
decide. More important than the semantics is that the active decision en-
forcement approach still does not overcome some of the problems that led
to the power of defaults in the ﬁrst place, such as problems associated with
a lack of knowledge or the inability of some to grapple with the complex-
ity of the choice set. Thus, my own conclusion from this chapter and the
underlying literature is that there is always a default option (although it is
not always well-speciﬁed) and that intelligent policy design must, there-
fore, pay careful attention to the behavior that the default will engender.
Perhaps out of modesty, the authors do not discuss in this chapter just
how inﬂuential and pervasive the idea that “defaults matter” has become
in policy circles over the past few years. For example, only in current
decade has it become standard for analyses of Social Security personal ac-
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the personal accounts is on an “opt-in” or an “opt-out” basis, largely be-
cause policymakers and analysts now understand that this distinction will
likely lead to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent participation rates. As another ex-
ample, the Pension Protection Act, which was signed into law in August
2006, includes numerous changes to the nation’s pension laws that are de-
signed to pave the way for employers to adopt “automatic enrollment” in
401(k) and similar plans. In a related eﬀort, the Department of Labor pro-
posed new regulations in September 2006 that will set the framework that
plan sponsors must work within when determining the investment portfo-
lio that individuals can be defaulted into when they are automatically en-
rolled in a 401(k) plan. There is little question in my mind that the academic
literature on the power of defaults has helped generate a tremendous (and
largely bipartisan) enthusiasm for “automatic enrollment” approaches in
the discussion of retirement policy in the United States.
Looking to the future, the one area of this body of work that has received
the least attention, at least relative to its importance to overall retirement
security, is the payout phase. The importance of this area is underscored by
the large literature exploring the large potential welfare gains from annu-
itization. A basic empirical fact about the private pension system in the
United States is that the vast majority of 401(k) plans do not even oﬀer
plan participants an option to annuitize their accounts at retirement. In
other words, the current default option is to leave wealth in an unannu-
itized form. My normative judgment (which has been inﬂuenced by the an-
nuities literature) is that this is a suboptimal default option because it
leaves individuals suboptimally exposed to longevity risk.
Designing an annuitized default option for the payout phase poses a
more diﬃcult policy challenge than most other aspects of the retirement
planning process, however, because of the “irreversible” nature of most ex-
isting annuity products. For example, we know that there will always be
some individuals for whom an annuity is not an attractive option, such as
those who are terminally ill or those with very strong bequest motives. If
these individuals are automatically annuitized at retirement, their welfare
could be substantially reduced if there is no way for them to undo the an-
nuity contract once they have entered into it. This makes the downside risk
of being defaulted into an annuity much larger than the downside of being
automatically enrolled into a 401(k) plan, which can easily be reversed if
the individual later decides to do so.
These diﬃculties, however, should not lead one to think that “no annu-
itization” is the better default. For example, one could imagine designing a
default with two features. First, make the annuitization gradual, or lad-
dered, such as by converting 20 percent of the account balance into an an-
nuity each year for ﬁve years. In addition to helping to smooth out asset
price and interest rate ﬂuctuations, such an approach gives an individual
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a person had 20 percent of their wealth automatically annuitized, this
would “focus the mind” on the beneﬁts and costs of doing so. At that point,
if they realize that full annuitization is not optimal, they can avoid it on
the remaining 80 percent of wealth. A second feature would be to allow a
limited period of reversibility, such as 6 months after annuitization. Re-
versibility would allow individuals an opportunity to “undo” the annuiti-
zation if they were opted in and subsequently realized they did not want
this. Keeping the time period short would limit the selection costs and ad-
ministrative costs that such an approach would impose on the system.
In summary, the body of evidence discussed in this chapter makes it clear
that default options matter at nearly every step in the ﬁnancial planning
process. Going forward, the research agenda in this area should seek to dis-
tinguish between the alternative hypotheses for why defaults matter. With
this knowledge in hand, policymakers and plan designers will be able to
more ﬁnely tune the policy levers that may increase average welfare of plan
participants.
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